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Secessions from EU Member States: 
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approach a seceded territory. – VI. Conclusion. 
 
ABSTRACT: We argue that EU law and the ethos of European integration, premised on inclusiveness 
and the taming of the State requires the Union to remain neutral in the context of the permutations 
of statehood at the national level leading to the emergence of the new State entities in Europe. We 
show that the matter of permutations of statehood is not new or exceptional, unlike what is some-
times claimed, and demonstrate that the EU is not to blame for facilitating the viability of newly-
emerging States in Europe, since this is one of the natural bi-products of the very nature of the Un-
ion. In this context intervening into national constitutional secession politics and making threats to 
prevent the newly-emerging States from joining the EU would not only be an ultra vires action for 
the EU to take. It will also be both counter-productive and deprived of any purpose, which leads us 
to conclude that EU law should be deployed as inventively as will be necessary to ensure continued 
membership in the EU of the entities seceding from the current Member States. 
 
KEYWORDS: secessions – EU integration – EU membership – accession – ethos EU. 
 
I. Introduction 
This article argues that there are no legal grounds for the European Union (EU) to take 
sides in the context of the internal processes within the Member States potentially lead-
ing to their territorial reconfiguration and even eventual secessions of their parts, re-
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sulting in the articulation of new statehood on the European continent.1 When con-
fronted with the demands of either the Member States’ governments or the secession-
ist regions to support their cause, EU’s neutral position (presuming that the process of 
the territorial reframing of statehood is taking place in a non-violent fashion and in full 
conformity with the law)2 is crucial for the success of democracy and the rule of law in 
the context of the strict observance of the principle of good neighbourly relations in Eu-
rope.3 Importantly, such neutrality necessarily implies assisting both parties (while act-
ing strictly within the sphere of competences of the Union, of course) to come as close 
as possible to the attainment of the Union objectives of peace, prosperity and demo-
cratic development embodied in the values, which the EU together with its Member 
States draws upon.4 It goes without saying that such assistance can take a variety of dif-
ferent forms, ranging from possible necessary accommodation of the special needs of a 
particular region in the process of devolution (which has traditionally been the case 
with the EU’s Overseas, for instance,5 where such accommodation is elevated to the 
 
1 For analyses of the legal mechanics of secessions under international law, see, e.g., C. WALTER, A. VON 
UNGERN-STERNBERG, K. ABUSHOV (eds), Self-Determination and Secession in International Law, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014; A. TANCREDI, La secessione nel diritto internazionale, Padova: CEDAM, 2001. See also: 
Supreme Court of Canada, Reference re Secession of Quebec, opinion of 20 August 1998, paras 103-104. 
For a thoughtful analysis of this case see: S. CHOUDRY, R. HOWSE, Constitutional Theory and the Quebec Se-
cession Reference, in Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, 2000, p. 143 et seq. For an overview of 
the thorny issues surrounding secessions in the EU context, see, e.g., S. DOUGLAS-SCOTT, How Easily Could 
an Independent Scotland Join the EU?, in University of Oxford Legal Research Paper Series, 2014; C. CLOSA 
(ed.), Troubled Membership: Dealing with Secession from a Member State and Withdrawal from the EU, in 
EUI Working Paper, 2014/91; D. KENEALY, S. MACLENNAN, Sincere Cooperation, Respect for Democracy and 
EU Citizenship: Sufficient to Guarantee Scotland’s Future in the European Union?, in European Law Journal, 
2014, p. 591 et seq.; N. MACCORMICK, Is there a Constitutional Path to Scottish Independence?, in Parliamen-
tary Affairs, 2000, p. 721 et seq.; D. EDWARD, EU Law and the Separation of Member States, in Fordham In-
ternational Law Journal, 2013, p. 1151 et seq.; N. WALKER, Beyond Secession? Law in the Framing of the Na-
tional Polity, in University of Edinburgh Europa Working Paper, 2014/11. 
2 Such as was the process of the Scottish secessionist referendum, for instance. The Edinburgh 
agreement, signed by the Scottish and United Kingdom (UK) government, on the referendum concerning 
Scottish independence provides prove of this. The text of the Agreement is available at www.gov.scot. See 
also: M. KEATING, Scotland and the EU: Comment by MICHAEL KEATING, in Verfassungsblog, 9 September 
2014, www.verfassungsblog.de. 
3 On the latter, see E. BASHESKA, The Good Neighbourliness Principle in EU Law, PhD Thesis 2014; see 
also E. BASHESKA, The Position of the Good Neighbourliness Principle in International and EU Law, in D. 
KOCHENOV, E. BASHESKA (eds), Good Neighbourliness in the European Legal Context, Leiden-Boston: Brill-
Nijhoff, 2015. 
4 As reflected in Art. 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), among other instruments. On the legal 
nature of this provision, see, C. HILLION, Overseeing the Rule of Law in the EU: Legal Mandate and Means, 
in C. CLOSA, D. KOCHENOV (eds), Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2016, forthcoming. 
5 Importantly, such accommodation in the context of the Overseas happens both vis-à-vis the re-
gions within the ambit of the acquis (so-called Outermost Regions) and the territories under the sover-
eignty of the Member States where the principle of the application of the acquis in full does not apply (so-
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rank of a principle of law)6 to providing newly-minted polities with full wholehearted as-
sistance in joining the Union, should they so desire.7  
Taking sides in the national secession/territorial rearrangement debates by pre-
venting and/or fostering (either directly or indirectly) particular outcomes in the context 
of the national constitutional rearrangements, is simply not among EU’s constitutional 
prerogatives: intervening into the resolution of these issues, thus shaping the Member 
States with no regard to their internal constitutional process, is not merely ultra vires 
action: it amounts to tyranny. Evidently, neutrality is, bearing in mind the political sali-
ence of secessions, a matter of perspective, which will be perceived differently by the 
opponents and advocates of separation. To claim, however, that it would be “extremely 
difficult if not impossible”8 for a seceded territory to join the EU clearly violates the im-
peratives of neutrality. Taking into account the palpable impact of the EU’s reactions on 
voting behavior in secession referendums,9 the EU should shy away from getting in-
volved in the national debate, but, instead, let it run its due course and respect the 
democratic process’ outcome. 
As is clear by now, this article embodies a principled disagreement with the domi-
nant position on the issue of secessions, espoused, inter alia, by Joseph Weiler,10 but 
 
called Associated Countries and Territories). For an overview, see, e.g., D. KOCHENOV, The Application of EU 
Law in the EU’s Overseas Regions, Countries, and Territories after the Entry into Force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon, in Michigan State International Law Review, 2012, p. 669 et seq. (and the literature cited therein). 
6 The principle of accommodation is enshrined in the Treaties through Arts 52, para. 2, TEU, 349, 355 
TFEU. See also K. MULLER, ‘Concentric Circles’ of the Periphery of the European Union, in Australian Journal 
of Politics & History, 2002, p. 322 et seq. Dock dues are, among numerous others, a great example of 
such accommodations: M. SLOTBOOM, L’application du Traité CE au commerce intraétatique? Le cas de l’ 
‘octroi de mer’, in Cahiers de Droit Européen, 1996, p. 9 et seq. See also P. PUISSOCHET, Aux confins de la 
Communauté européenne: les régions ultrapériphériques, in G.C. RODRÍGUEZ IGLESIAS et al. (eds), Melanges 
en hommage à Fernand Schockweiler, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999, p. 491 et seq., pp. 504–506. For a 
good summary of the development of the octroi de mer case-law of the Cort of Justice (CJEU) see also 
Court of Justice, judgment of 7 November 1996, case C-126/94, Société Cadi Surgelés, Société Sofrigu, So-
ciété Sofroi and Société Sofriber v. Ministre des Finances and Directeur général des douanes. See also 
judgment of 12 February 1992, case C-260/90, Leplat. On the derogations more generally, see, e.g. D. 
KOCHENOV, De praktische toepassing van Artikel 299 als grondgebied voor derogaties, in H.E. BRÖRING et al. 
(eds), Schurende rechtsordes: Over juridische implicaties van de UPG-status voor de eilandgebieden van 
de Nederlandse Antillen en Aruba, Groningen: Europa Law Publishing, 2008. 
7 For a lucid analysis of the rules on joining the EU, see, S. DOUGLAS-SCOTT, How Easily Could an Inde-
pendent Scotland Join the EU?, cit., p. 6. 
8 These were Barroso’s much criticised comments on the Scottish secession debate, available at 
news.bbc.co.uk. For a critique: N. WALKER, Hijacking the Debate, in Blog of the UK Constitutional Law Asso-
ciation, 18 February 2014, www.ukconstitutionallaw.org. 
9 N. WALKER, Beyond Secession? Law in the Framing of the National Polity, cit., footnote 13 and ac-
companying text. 
10 J.H.H. WEILER, Scotland and the EU: A Comment by JOSEPH H.H. WEILER, in Verfassungsblog, 10 
September 2014, www.verfassungsblog.de. His view on Catalonia is very similar. J.H.H. WEILER, Catalonian 
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also finding support with the EU institutions,11 that the EU should prevent secessionist 
claims at the national level from succeeding through an effective politics of blocking the 
processes of successfully-formed new States’ inclusion into the Union, thereby making 
secessions unattractive and guaranteeing a stable number of Member States through 
what we see as an indirect coercive intervention with the constitutional politics at the 
national level. The demands that the Union stay out of the heated political battles 
around such thorny issues seem to be most justified. The goal of the article is to ex-
plain, clarify and defend this position. 
We proceed in four steps. Firstly, we draw on a number of historical examples in 
Europe and elsewhere to demonstrate beyond any doubt how common the mutations 
of statehood are, secessions included. Indeed, (much) more than half of what used to 
be the founding Member States’ territory has left their sovereignty since the creation of 
the European Communities.12 Moreover, a significant number of the Member States of 
 
Independence and the European Union, in Blog of the European Journal of International Law, 20 Decem-
ber 2012, www.ejiltalk.org. 
11 Barroso’s comments on the Scottish secession debate, cit. Later, Juncker, Barroso’s successor, 
toned down those claims: www.scotsman.com. However, Juncker, then still in his capacity as leader of the 
European People’s Party (EPP), has made similar remarks as Barroso with respect to the independence 
movement in Catalonia, saying that “[t]hose who believe that Europe would accept an independent Cata-
lonia, are fundamentally wrong”. For the interview in Spanish see Junker: “Una Cataluña independiente no 
seria aceptada en Europa”, in abc.es, 28 April 2014, www.abc.es. The Commission letters recently sent in 
response Santiago Fisas’ (Member of the European Parliament of the Popular Party) question, asking 
whether the Commission would recognise an independent Catalan State created by a declaration that 
would not respect the Spanish constitution also demonstrates the EU’s ambivalence in this situation. 
While the English version states that “[i]t is not for the Commission to express a position on questions of 
internal organisation related to the constitutional arrangements of a particular Member State”, the Span-
ish version adds another nine sentences, which, when translated, read as follows: “The Commission re-
calls in this context that, in accordance with the provisions of Article 4, paragraph 2, TEU, the Union must 
respect the ‘national identities [of Member States], inherent in their fundamental structures, political and 
constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. It shall respect their essential State func-
tions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the state’. A Member State’s territory is determined 
only by national constitutional law, and not by the decision of an automatic parliament contrary to the 
constitution of that state”. The letters are available at www.euobserver.com 24 September 2015, 
“Juncker's answer on Catalonia grew in translation ”. The Catalonian situation is different, of course, from 
the Scottish due to the unconstitutionality of the Catalonian independence claims: R. RINCÓN, El Constitu-
cional anula la declaración soberanista por unanimidad, in El Paìs, 2 December 2015, 
www.politica.elpais.com. 
12 Besides of course Algeria which was fully incorporated into the French Republic at the inception of 
the Communities and the Netherlands East Indies and New Guinea, the Member States possessed a vari-
ety of territories around the world and it was not the intention of the Communities to let these territories 
go. Indeed, their incorporation into the internal market in the mid - to long-term future was a crucial con-
dition for the French participation in the European integration project: D. CUSTOS, Implications of the Eu-
ropean Integration for the Overseas, in D. KOCHENOV (ed.), EU Law of the Overseas, Alphen aan den Rijn: 
Kluwer Law International, 2011, p. 91 et seq. Following Ziller’s helpful compilation, the Member States’ 
territories then included: the Belgian territories of Congo and Rwanda-Burundi, Italian protectorate of 
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the EU are direct products of recent permutations of statehood, some of them gaining 
statehood with the clear support of the Union.13 The same applies to some candidate 
countries.14 To say that secessions are somewhat extraordinary would thus be a serious 
and unhelpful misrepresentation of reality. They are a day-to-day part of the life of the 
international community15 (Section I). Having thus set the ground for the discussion and 
dismissed the false exceptionalism of secessions, the article moves on by explaining the 
importance of the principle of democracy as a foundational value for the EU, as well as 
its limits. It is suggested that those, who believe the EU should not embrace seceded 
territories do not take the principle of democracy sufficiently seriously (Section III). If a 
seceded State desires to join the EU, the need to accommodate the people’s will is not 
premised only upon the EU’s foundational values, but also follows from the EU’s historic 
ethos of openness to new members16 (Section IV). What is required, therefore, in the 
case of legally and constitutionally sound secessions is that the EU employ all the legal 
and political tools at its disposal to prevent a (temporary) termination of the enjoyment 
of rights stemming from the seceding territory’s membership of the EU as part of the 
Member State it is about to leave, would the people of the newly emerged State express 
the will to remain part of the EU. In full agreement with Sionaidh Douglas-Scott’s crisp 
argument,17 we believe that a large number of legal-political tools at the disposal of the 
Union, coupled with good will of all the actors involved makes it legally possible to en-
 
Somalia, to the Netherlands New Guinea, and to the French equatorial Africa (Côte-d’Ivoire, Dahomey, 
Guinea, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Sudan, and Upper Volta), French East Africa (Moyen-Congo (the future 
Central African Empire beloved by Giscard d’Estaing), Gabon, Oubangui-Chari and Chad), protectorates 
Togo and Cameroon, Comoros Islands (Mayotte, separated from them is now an outermost region of the 
EU), Madagascar, Côte Française des Somalis. Following the UK accession, the list of the associated coun-
tries and territories became much longer, including (besides the countries and territories still on the list) 
Bahamas, Brunei, Caribbean Colonies and Associated States (Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and 
Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Anguilla, British Honduras), Gilbert and Ellis Islands, Line Islands, the An-
glo-French Condominium of the New Hebrides, Solomon Islands, and Seychelles. J. ZILLER, L’Union eu-
ropéenne et l'outre-mer, in Pouvoirs, 2005, p. 145 et seq., pp. 146-147. 
13 Which is attested, for instance, by the work of the Badinter Commission: F. HOFFMEISTER, The Con-
tribution of EU Practice to International Law, in M. CREMONA (ed.), Developments in EU External Relations 
Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 37 et seq. 
14 In one example, it was due to the EU’s efforts that a deal laying down the rules concerning the rules 
of the Montenegrin independence referendum was brokered between the pro- and anti-independence 
movements. Following EU recommendations, it was decided that for independence to be gained, a 55 per 
cent majority was required. For a detailed analysis of the negotiations see: K. FRIIS, The Referendum in 
Montenegro: The EU’s ‘Postmodern Diplomacy, in European Foreign Affairs Review, 2007, p. 67. 
15 A. TANCREDI, La secessione nel diritto internazionale, cit. 
16 For a seminal early treatment, see P. SOLDATOS, G. VANDERSANDEN, L’admission dans la CEE – Essai 
’interprétation juridique’, in Cahiers de Droit Européen, 1968, p. 674 et seq.; D. KOCHENOV, EU Enlargement 
and the Failure of Conditionality, Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2008, chapter 1 (and the 
literature cited therein). 
17 S. DOUGLAS-SCOTT, How Easily Could an Independent Scotland Join the EU?, cit. 
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sure that no such termination comes about and all the efforts are taken to ensure con-
tinuity (Section V). The conclusion is simple: secessions are ordinary events in interna-
tional life, which are up to the polities themselves to manage. EU’s interventions into 
this process (no matter whether these are active, or passive in nature) should thus nec-
essarily be frowned upon as uncalled for from the point of view of the principle of de-
mocracy as well as the ethos of the Union, its value-laden nature considered and, im-
portantly, would lack any legal basis. 
II. A word about the artificiality of secessions’ exceptionalism 
Secession from a Member State of the European Union is nothing new. History knows 
plentiful examples of what has at times erroneously been portrayed as a novel prob-
lem. One should only recall the origins of the EU as a Eurafrican Union18 and look at the 
contemporary maps: from Vanuatu to Congo, from Somalia and Suriname, European 
sovereignty has receded, bringing with it exclusion from the internal market19 and the 
European Convention of Human Rights.20 Hailing “the development of the African con-
tinent” as the “essential task” of Europe,21 the Schuman Declaration (Europe’s mischie-
vous messianic document)22 clearly belongs to a different era, when decolonization was 
perceived as an impossibility and European nations’ power over the Overseas domin-
 
18 P. HANSEN, S. JONSSON, Building Eurafrica: Reviving Colonialism through European Integration, 1920-
60, in K. NICOLAIDIS, B. SEBE, G. MAAS (eds), Echoes of Empire: Identity, Memory, and Colonial Legacies, Lon-
don: I.B. Tauris, 2015; P. HANSEN, S. JONSSON, Eurafrica: The Untold History of European Integration and 
Colonialism, London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014; P. HANSEN, S. JONSSON, Bringing Africa as a “Dowry to 
Europe”: European Integration and the Eurafrican Project, in Interventions, 2011, p. 443 et seq.; P. HANSEN, 
S. JONSSON, Imperial Origins of European Integration and the Case of Eurafrica: A Reply to Gary Marks’ ‘Eu-
rope and Its Empires’, in Journal of Common Market Studies, 2012, p. 1028 et seq.; D. CUSTOS, Implications 
of the European Integration for the Overseas, cit. 
19 All the Cotonou agreements notwithstanding. K. ARTS, ACP-EU Relations in a New Era: The Cotonou 
Agreement, in Common Market Law Review, 2003, p. 95 et seq.; S. BARTELT, ACP-EU Development Cooper-
ation at a Crossroads? One Year after the Second Revision of the Cotonou Agreement, in European For-
eign Affairs Review, 2012, p. 1 et seq. 
20 A. HALLO DE WOLF, The Application of Human Rights Treaties in Overseas Countries and Territories, 
in D. KOCHENOV (ed.), EU Law of the Overseas, cit. See, however, European Court of Human Rights, judg-
ment of 28 April 2009, no. 11890/05, Bijelić v. Montenegro and Serbia, where the Court found that the 
Convention might be deemed as continuously in force, thereby applying to a seceded entity: an approach 
unknown in the times of decolonisation. 
21 The relevant paragraph of the Declaration of 9 May 1950 reads as follows: “With increased re-
sources Europe will be able to pursue the achievement of one of its essential tasks, namely, the devel-
opment of the African continent”. Full text is available at www.robert-schuman.eu. 
22 J.H.H. WEILER, Deciphering the Political and Legal DNA of European Integration: An Exploratory Es-
say, in J. DICKSON, P. ELEFTHERIADIS (eds), Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012, p. 137 et seq. 
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ions was presumed eternal, destined to last.23 The sovereign territories of the majority 
of the founding Member States of the Union have shrunk in the most radical fashion.24 
The same applies to numerous Member States to have joined later:25 British colonial 
law was denigrated from one of the key areas of law into the relative obscurity of a 
mere panopticum of exotic topics.26 The territorial shrinking in question did not only 
happen due to the elevation to statehood of the colonial possessions27 – these were, in 
many respects, separate legal entities28 with their own law and nationality29 – but also, 
at least in one important example, through splitting the Member States proper: Algeria 
was France.30 Besides, some territories were said to have “left the EU”,31 while at the 
same time formally remaining part of a Member State. While some actually never 
“joined”,32 others constantly fluctuated (or at least appeared to be fluctuating)33 be-
 
23 P. HANSEN, S. JONSSON, Building Eurafrica: Reviving Colonialism through European Integration, 1920-
60, cit.; P. HANSEN, S. JONSSON, Eurafrica: The Untold History of European Integration and Colonialism, cit.; 
P. HANSEN, S. JONSSON, Bringing Africa as a “Dowry to Europe”: European Integration and the Eurafrican 
Project, cit.; P. HANSEN, S. JONSSON, Imperial Origins of European Integration and the Case of Eurafrica: A 
Reply to Gary Marks’ ‘Europe and Its Empires’, cit. 
24 Germany, of course, is the most radical counter-example: Treaty on the Establishment of German 
Unity of 31 August 1990, Art. 1; M. BOTHE, The German Experience to Meet the Challenges of Reunifica-
tion, in A.E. KELLERMAN et al. (eds), EU Enlargement: The Constitutional Impact at EU and National Level, 
The Hague: Asser Press, 2011, p. 435 et seq.; E. GRABITZ, L’unité allemande et l’intégration européenne, in 
Cahiers de Droit Européen, 1991, p. 3 et seq.; J.-P. JACQUÉ, L’unification de l’Allemagne et la Communauté 
européenne, in Revue générale de droit international public, 1990, p. 997 et seq. 
25 For the Europe-wide take, see, D. KOCHENOV (ed.), EU Law of the Overseas, cit.; R. ADLER-NISSEN, U. 
PRAM GAD (eds), European Integration and Postcolonial Sovereignty Games: The EU Overseas Countries 
and Territories, London: Routledge, 2013. 
26 I. HENDRY, S. DICKINSON, British Overseas Territories Law, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011. 
27 Thus, for the first time in history, making statehood the dominant form of the legal-political organ-
isation of the world: P. KJÆR, Constitutionalism in the Global Realm: A Sociological Approach, London: 
Routledge, 2014. 
28 See, e.g. the classic treatise on British colonial law by Sir Kenneth Roberts-Wray, outlining these 
complexities with great clarity: K. ROBERTS-WRAY, Commonwealth and Colonial Law, London: Stevens and 
Stevens, 1966. 
29 For an example from the Dutch East Indies law, see, e.g. B. DE HART, De verwerpelijkste van alle 
gemengde huwelijken. De Gemengde Huwelijken Regeling Nederlands-Indië 1898 en de Rijkswet op het 
Nederlanderschap 1892 vergeleken, in Jaarboek voor Vrouwengeschiedenis, 2001, p. 60 et seq. 
30 Algeria was fully incorporated first following the formation of the Second Republic (1848). G. 
PERVILLÉ, La politique algérienne de la France, de 1830 à 1962, in Le Genre humain, 1997, p. 27 et seq.  
31 Treaty amending, with regard to Greenland, the Treaties establishing the European Communities 
of 13 March 1984 (The Greenland Treaty); F. WEISS, Greenland’s Withdrawal from the European Communi-
ties, in European Law Review, 1985, p. 173 et seq. “Leaving” is not a correct characterisation of this trea-
ty’s key legal effect: Greenland simply changed its status under the Treaties, becoming an Overseas Coun-
try or Territory in the sense of Annex II, which means that a lot of EU law applied there. 
32 Such examples include, inter alia, Macao, Hong Kong (B. HOOK, M. SANTOS NEVES, The Role of Hong 
Kong and Macau in China’s Relations with Europe, in The China Quarterly, 2002, p. 108 et seq.), Faroe Is-
lands (Art. 355, para. 5, lett. a), TFEU), Suriname (which decided not to join the Communities when the 
 
74 Dimitry Kochenov and Martijn van den Brink 
tween in and out.34 Some opted to stay in, the decolonization drive notwithstanding.35 
The place of global-territorial ambitions and failed imperial narratives in the evolution 
of the European Union (marked by total scholarly silence for decades) is finally studied 
in a serious fashion.36  
Turning to Europe proper (now conceived of geographically, not through its “mis-
sion civilisatrice”, as half-hearted, as it was Quichotean), a simple glance at the state-
hood of the current Member States suffices to make a basic point: mutations of state-
hood (in different forms that they may take)37 are responsible for the creation / consol-
idation of a number of the Member States of the EU, from the decolonization context 
spurring Malta and Cyprus into existence to the regaining of statehood by the Baltic 
 
Netherlands Antilles asked to be included as Overseas Countries or Territories, UK Sovereign Base Areas 
in Cyprus (SBAs) (Art. 355, para. 5, lett. b), TFEU); S. LAUHLÉ-SHAELOU, The Principle of Territorial Exclusion in 
the EU: SBAs in Cyprus – A Special Case of Sui Generis Territories in the EU, in D. KOCHENOV (ed.), EU Law 
of the Overseas, cit., p. 153 et seq. Some did join at a later stage compared with the ratification of the 
Treaties by their “mother country”. The examples include the former Netherlands Antilles (Convention to 
amend the Treaty setting up the European Economic Community with the object of making the special 
system of Association defined in Part Pour of that Treaty applicable to the Netherlands Antilles of 13 No-
vember 1962) and Canary Islands (See, Regulation (EEC) No 1911/1991 of the Council on the application 
of the provisions of Community law to the Canary Islands). 
33 Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon is the best example: France claimed to have changed the status of the 
territory unilaterally on a number of occasion. It is not entirely clear whether such unilateral change 
(which was entirely in line with the Treaty text at the time) actually resulted in a difference in treatment 
vis-à-vis the Communities. The Commission claimed it did: Written Question No 400/76 by Mr. Lagorce to 
the Commission concerting the situation of the islands Saint-Pierre-and-Miquelon, para. 1. 
34 For a detailed analysis of the case of Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon, see, D. KOCHENOV, The Application of 
EU Law in the EU’s Overseas Regions, Countries, and Territories after the Entry into Force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon, cit., note 321. 
35 Mayotte, breaking away from the Comores is a great example, as is Aruba, which was being 
pushed out of the Kingdom by the Dutch government, but managed to remain part of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands. See, on Mayotte, H. BÉRINGER, Départementalisation de Mayotte: Un changement de régime 
statutaire aix enjeux internationaux, in Revue Juridique et Politique, 2010, p. 176 et seq.; H. BÉRINGER, La 
question de Mayotte devant le Parlement français, in O. GOHIN P. MAURICE (eds), Paris: L.G.D.J., 1996, p. 199 
et seq. On Aruba, see, D. KOCHENOV, Le droit européen et le fédéralisme néerlandais: Une dynamique en 
evolution progressive, in J.-Y. FABERON, V. FAYAUD, J.-M. REGNAULT (eds), Destins des collectivités politique 
d’Oceanie, Marseille: Presses Universitaires d’Aix-Marseille, 2012. 
36 K. NICOLAIDIS, B. SEBE, G. MAAS (eds), Echoes of Empire: Identity, Memory, and Colonial Legacies, 
London: I.B. Tauris, 2015. The EU, for some, is an Empire too, and the arguments supporting this claim 
are worthy of a serious consideration: J. ZIELONKA, Europe as Empire: The Nature of the Enlarged Europe-
an Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
37 These could amount to the denunciation of pre-existing founding treaties forming union states; 
the emergence of dual statehood under pressure from the winning powers in the post-war context; res-
toration of independence lost at a certain point in the past, and so forth. What is relevant for us here is 
the general dynamic nature of statehood’s mutation and (re)emergence, which is certainly observable in 
the contemporary context. 
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States,38 the split between the Czech and the Slovak Republics,39 and the articulation of 
Slovenia and Croatia, as well as the united Germany, following the incorporation of the 
German Democratic Republic (DDR) and Berlin (West) into the Federal Republic,40 and 
France, with Algeria leaving.41 Some of these sovereignties are fictitious: Cyprus does 
not control a good half of its territory, with one of the most important borders in Eu-
rope being branded a “green line”;42 Algeria was only excluded from the Treaties with 
the Maastricht revision – many years (and many chances to adjust the text to reality) 
following independence in 1962. Crucially, the EU, as well as its individual Member 
States, played an important role in bringing about such mutations of statehood not only 
with regard to the entities which came to be Member States,43 but also other countries, 
including loose protectorates that the EU has created.44 
All in all, thus, two important lessons from the above emerge. Firstly, mutations of 
statehood are not exceptional. To present them as rare would be a mistake, in the “his-
torical time” at least. A large number of Member States spent the longest share of their 
“life” (especially in their contemporary borders and humbler, post-imperial emanations) 
as Members of the EU, boasting little (sometimes virtually none) of recent history of 
 
38 For a meticulous analysis, see P. VAN ELSUWEGE, From Soviet Republics to EU Member States, Lei-
den-Boston: Brill-Nijhoff, 2008. See also: I. ZIEMELE, State Continuity and Nationality: The Baltic States and 
Russia – Past, Present and Future as Defined by International Law, Leiden-Boston: Brill-Nijhoff, 2005; A. 
DIMITROVS, V. POLESHCHUK, Kontinuitet kak osnova gosudarstvennosti i ètnopolitiki v Latvii i Èstonii, in V. 
POLESHCHUK, V. STEPANOV (eds), Ètnopolitika stran Baltii, Moscow: Nauka, 2013. 
39 For an overview of the legal implications of the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, see, M. PALOUS, 
Questions of Czech Citizenship, in A. LIEBICH, D. WARNER, J. DRAGOVIC (eds), Citizenship East and West, Lon-
don: Routledge, 1995, p. 141 et seq. For the general assessment of secessions in the context of the East-
European eruption of state-making, see, C.R. SUNSTEIN, Constitutionalism and Secession, in University of 
Chicago Law Review, 1991, p. 633 et seq. 
40 R.W. PIOTROWICZ, The Status of Germany in International Law: Deutschland über Deutschland?, in 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1989, p. 609 et seq. 
41 P. LAFFONT, Histoire de la France en Algérie, Paris: Plon, 1979. 
42 S.L. SHAELOU, Market Freedoms, Fundamental Rigths, and the European Public Order: Views from 
Cyprus, in Yearbook of European Law, 2011, p. 298 et seq.; N. SKOUTARIS, The status of Northern Cyprus 
under EU law: a comparative approach to the territorial suspension of the acquis, in D. KOCHENOV (ed.), EU 
Law of the Overseas, cit., p. 401 et seq. 
43 F. HOFFMEISTER, The Contribution of EU Practice to International Law, cit. 
44 On the role of the EU in Kosovo see: W. KOETH, State Building without a State: The EU’s Dilemma in 
Defining Its Relations with Kosovo, in European Foreign Affairs Review, 2010, p. 227 et seq.; S. ROZÉE, Or-
der-Maintenance in Kosovo: The EU as an Increasingly Comprehensive Police Actor?, in European Foreign 
Affairs Review, 2015, p. 97 et seq.; S. ECONOMIDES, J. KER-LINDSAY, Forging EU Policy Unity from Diversity: 
The ‘Unique Case’ of the Kosovo Status Talks, in European Foreign Affairs Review, 2010, p. 495 et seq. For 
Bosnia see: A. VOH BOSTIC, The Role of the European Union’s Expert Assistance in the Process of Peace-
Building: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in European Foreign Affairs Review, 2010, p. 209 et seq.; 
M.A. VACHUDOVA, The Thieves of Bosnia: The Complicated Legacy of the Dayton Peace Accords, in Foreign 
Affairs, 24 February 2014, www.foreignaffairs.com. 
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statehood without, the EU unquestionably emerging as an essential part of what they 
are as sovereign States.45 
Besides the “normality” of secessions and territorial fluctuations as testified by their 
commonality and omnipresence, secondly, history teaches us also the lesson of flexibil-
ity of the legal arrangements in many of these cases. This flexibility definitely includes 
EU law and international law: from citizenship rules,46 to adaptations to the unique cir-
cumstances of each particular case: the Badinter commission, just as the adaptations of 
the pre-accession regime to accept divided Cyprus, in ephemeral control of the island,47 
are the cases in point. These lessons should be taken into account in full while inter-
preting the limits of the Treaties in dealing with secessions and accessions.  
Now the potential permutations of statehood (secessions in particular) are coming 
much closer to “home”, to the “centre”, leaving behind the confines of the colonial and 
Eastern European periphery, often disregarded by EU legal scholars as insignificant.48 
So does the scholarly debate.49 It would be most naïf to believe that due to the “No” 
camp’s victory in the last year’s Scottish referendum,50 the question of the future rela-
tionship with the EU of an independent Scotland has disappeared from the agenda for 
now. The jinni is out of the bottle. Consequently, precisely how the EU should approach 
secessionist movements’ calls for devolution and independence is a question that is as 
important as ever. It is abundantly clear that the issue is definitely staying on the agen-
da. A number of Member States still see movements that strive for secession. Catalonia 
in particular springs to mind, also Flanders, possibly the Basque country, but the Scot-
tish referendum outcome also has not silenced those advocating Scottish independ-
ence; its call for independence might very well resurge, particularly so should the major-
 
45 For an illuminating analysis of the place of statehood in the international legal landscape, which is 
frequently misunderstood, see P.F. KJÆR, Constitutionalism in the Global Realm: A Sociological Approach, cit. 
46 EU law honours the Member States’ determinations, for instance, of nationality for the purposes of 
EU law, which implies that non-nationals of the Member States could be considered EU citizens and vice 
versa, some nationals could be considered non-EU citizens. The German and the UK approaches to citizen-
ship are particular cases in point, both tolerated by EU law: Court of Justice, judgment of 20 February 2001, 
case C-192/99, The Queen v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Manjit Kaur, para. 27. 
For a detailed analysis of this particular issue, see, e.g., D. KOCHENOV, A. DIMITROVS, EU Citizenship for the 
Latvian ‘Non-Citizens’: A Concrete Proposal, in Houston Journal of International Law, 2016, p. 101 et seq. 
47 E. BASHESKA, D. KOCHENOV, Thanking the Greeks: The Crisis of the Rule of Law in EU Enlargement 
Regulation, in Southeastern Europe, 2015, p. 392 et seq. 
48 D. KUKOVEC, Taking Change Seriously: The Rhetoric of Justice and the Reproduction of the Status 
Quo, in D. KOCHENOV, G. DE BÚRCA, A. WILLIAMS (eds), Europe’s Justice Deficit?, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015, 
p. 319 et seq. 
49 See for a wide range of arguments the by S. Douglas-Scott initiated discussion on the Verfas-
sungsblog: S. DOUGLAS-SCOTT, Scotland and the EU: Eleventh hour thoughts on a contested subject, in Ver-
fassungsblog, 17 September 2014, www.verfassungsblog.de. 
50 Of the 84.6 per cent of the eligible voters, 55.3 per cent voted in favour of the Union against 44.7 
per cent in favour of independence. For an analysis, see, e.g. T. MULLEN, The Scottish Independence Ref-
erendum, in Journal of Law and Society, 2014, p. 627 et seq. 
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ity of the UK population decide to vote in favor of leaving the EU in the in-out referen-
dum promised by the Tories.51 Also plentiful other regions in Romania, Slovakia, France, 
Italy, Greece and elsewhere come to mind. Some Member States are noted for playing 
with ethnonationalism of the kin-minorities across borders,52 thus contributing to the 
richness of the palette of challenges we are speaking about. 
Crucially, however, the EU’s own experience of State-creation through secessions in 
the Balkans and a welcoming attitude to newly-emerging States in the East of Europe 
seems to be entirely ignored by the on-going scholarly debate, leaving room to hypocri-
sy accusations, no doubt. While the EU (albeit quasi-unofficially) condones Kosovo 
statehood53 and strongly ethno-nationalist experiments elsewhere,54 EU officials pro-
claim that for Scots and Catalans, when independent, there might be no future within 
the EU. The debate about Western European secessions is thus entirely disconnected 
from the facts observable in practice.55 This perspective, devoid of historical outlook is 
highly problematic, to say the least. 
Even though no secession and secessionist movement is the same, making it difficult 
to draw comparisons between Scotland, Catalonia, Kosovo and the many other examples, 
the question what position the EU should adopt in the secessionist context is highly rele-
vant. The argument developed here is that as long as secessions are legally and constitu-
tionally sound the EU should not take sides in independence debates: blackmailing the 
secessionist regions into remaining parts of larger States is not the way forward, antithet-
ical to the EU’s values of democracy and the Rule of Law. Inspired by those values, the EU 
should adopt a neutral stance on the independence referenda, respect the will of the 
people eligible to vote, and recognize secessions that happened in accordance with the 
EU’s constitutional principles, just as it has consistently done in the past in the cases of 
many of its Member States, helping to come up with such secessionist rules itself (which is 
a no small matter) thus fundamentally advancing, in the words of Frank Hoffmeister, the 
 
51 On this and the UK referendum more generally: S. DOUGLAS-SCOTT, A UK Exit from the EU: The End 
of the United Kingdom or a New Constitutional Dawn?, in Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper, 2015/25; 
M. KEATING, The European Dimension to Scottish Constitutional Change, in The Political Quarterly, 2015, p. 
208 et seq.; Editorial Comments, Union Membership in Times of Crisis, in Common Market Law Review, 
2014, p. 1 et seq.; N. FORWOOD, Chinese Curses, Lawyers’ Dreams, Political Nightmares and New Dawns: 
Interesting Times for the UK’s Relationship with the EU, in Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Stud-
ies, 2012, p. 83 et seq. 
52 E.g. J.-M. ARAIZA, Good Neighbourliness as the Limit of Extra-territorial Citizenship: The Case of 
Hungary and Slovakia, in D. KOCHENOV, E. BASHESKA (eds), Good Neighbourliness in the European Legal 
Context, cit., p. 114 et seq. 
53 Communication COM(2009) 5343 of the Commission, Kosovo Fulfilling its European Perspective. At 
the moment Kosovo is designated as a potential membership candidate. Available at www.ec.europa.eu. 
54 On the systemic ethnic discrimination in Latvia and Estonia, see, e.g. D. KOCHENOV, V. POLESHCHUK, 
A. DIMITROVS, Do Professional Linguistic Requirements Discriminate? A Legal Analysis: Estonia and Latvia in 
the Spotlight, in European Yearbook of Minority Issues, 2013, p. 137 et seq. 
55 J.H.H. WEILER, Scotland and the EU: a Comment by JOSEPH H.H. WEILER, cit. 
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development of international law on the matter.56 This being said, criticism of grotesque 
mockery of allowing the people to speak out in order to cover-up military aggression 
should obviously be frowned upon and publically condemned.57 
Would the people of the newly emerged State express the will to remain part of the 
EU, moreover, the EU should aspire to employ all the available political and legal tools 
to ensure the continuation of EU membership and protect those citizens and compa-
nies that benefit from the internal market and important EU rights in other spheres 
from a temporary disapplication of the acquis. The EU’s historic ethos of inclusion,58 in-
tegration and reaching out to the other would be betrayed would the EU frustrate the 
accession of States that acquired independence through secession. Moreover, it will 
clearly amount to a reversal of a very consistent practice to date: even Kosovo (not a 
State yet, as far as the EU is concerned)59 is offered “a clear European perspective”,60 
this, notwithstanding the fact, of course, that the Treaty does not provide for a possibil-
ity of the accession to the Union of any entities, which are not “European States”.61 The 
EU can be very flexible (including with its own law) when it so wants. Not only famously 
absurd politics of veto-wielding,62 but also the Union’s in-built aspirational idealism 
should help finding the proper legal solutions to do the right thing. The EU should thus 
try to accommodate the will of the people of the newly emerged State, thereby also 
protecting them against an unnecessary loss of their rights stemming from the EU legal 
order. Once again, we fully realize that in putting forth such claims, we contradict an 
important trend in European legal scholarship on the matter, which remained astonish-
ingly incoherent, oblivious of precedent and context-driven throughout the whole run-
up to the Scottish independence referendum. 
 
56 F. HOFFMEISTER, The Contribution of EU Practice to International Law, cit. 
57 C. WALTER, Postscript: Self-Determination, Secession, and the Crimean Crisis 2014, in C. WALTER, A. 
VON UNGERN-STERNBERG, K. ABUSHOV (eds), Self-Determination and Secession in International Law, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 293 et seq.; J.A. GREEN, Editorial Comment. The Annexation of Crimea: 
Russia, Passportisation and the Protection of Nationals Revisited, in Journal on the Use of Force and In-
ternational Law, 2014, p. 3 et seq.; E. MILANO, The Non-Recognition of Russia’s Annexation of Crimea: 
Three Different Legal Approaches and One Unanswered Question, in Questions of International Law, 
2014, p. 35 et seq.; A. TANCREDI, The Russian Annexation of the Crimea: Questions Relating to the Use of 
Force, in Questions of International Law, 2014, p. 5 et seq. 
58 P. SOLDATOS, G. VANDERSANDEN, L’admission dans la CEE – Essai ’interprétation juridique’, cit. 
59 Of all EU Member States, Spain, Romania, Greece, Cyprus, and Slovakia have not recognised Koso-
vo. As a consequence, the EU, when referring to Kosovo, includes a footnote specifying that “this designa-
tion is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the 
Kosovo Declaration of Independence”. See, for example, the Kosovo status on the European Commission 
– Enlargment Policy webpage, ec.europa.eu/enlargement. 
60 See sources cited in footnote 53. 
61 The language of Art. 49 TEU is quite clear, notwithstanding certain scholarly disagreements on this 
issue, as summarized, e.g. in D. KOCHENOV, EU Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality, cit. 
62 For an array of examples, see, E. BASHESKA, D. KOCHENOV, Thanking the Greeks: The Crisis of the 
Rule of Law in EU Enlargement Regulation, cit. 
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III. The principle of democracy and its limits 
In one of the most thought-provoking contributions to the secessionist debate, Joseph 
Weiler has argued that the EU should not embrace those regions that one day may re-
quire statehood through secession from an EU Member State. He appears to believe 
the secessionist movements to be guided by a “seriously misdirected social and eco-
nomic egoism, cultural and national hubris and the naked ambition of local politi-
cians”;63 a “go it alone mentality”64 that is diametrically opposed to the normative foun-
dations of the European Union, which is based on forward looking, reconciliatory, and 
inclusionary ethics. Considering that “Europe should not seem as a Nirvana for that 
form of irredentist Euro-tribalism which contradicts the deep values and needs of the 
Union”,65 the EU must wish territories that want to secede “a Bon Voyage in their sepa-
ratist destiny”.66  
Problematically, Weiler’s argument ignores the principle of self-determination and 
thereby one of the core values upon which the EU is founded, namely democracy. The 
Treaty on European Union contains numerous provisions stressing the importance of 
democracy. Not only is the EU, according to Art. 2 TEU, founded upon the values of re-
spect for democracy, its functioning is based on principles of representative democracy 
(Art. 10 TEU), and also in its external action the EU has promised to respect and pro-
mote democratic deliberation (Art. 21 TEU). If we accept that the issue of secession 
must be approached from an EU legal perspective, rather than traditional international 
law,67 the principle of democracy ought to be among the main principles guiding the EU 
as well as the Member States when determining their position with respect to seceding 
territories. 
That democratic considerations should be central to the position the EU should take 
on secession is not difficult to grasp. The EU would simply disregard the values upon 
which it is founded and which it has promised to uphold and promote would it not take 
seriously the peoples’ exercise of self-determination.68 Agreeing with Daniel Kenealy, the 
EU “would border on the schizophrenic” would it not allow a territory that has democrat-
ically opted for secession to become a Member State of the EU.69 The position advocated 
by Weiler arguably does not take sufficiently seriously the democratic aspiration of self-
 




67 For a compelling argument to this see: S. DOUGLAS-SCOTT, How Easily Could an Independent Scot-
land Join the EU, cit., p. 10. 
68 See also, D. EDWARD, EU Law and the Separation of Member States, cit., p. 1154. 
69 D. KENEALY, How Do You Solve a Problem like Scotland? A Proposal Regarding ‘Internal Enlarge-
ment’, in Journal of European Integration, 2014, p. 585 et seq. 
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determination of some of the people in Europe.70 Respect for the democratic will of the 
people of the seceding territory would require the EU to respect the outcome of the ex-
ercise of a democratic right and not to punish those exercising that right. Of course, se-
cession does not need to happen via democratic means, but it would be difficult to imag-
ine a Member State territory seceding by the use of force at the moment. 
We must agree with Carlos Closa that the principle of democracy “must be under-
stood in the light of the principles of respect for human rights, the rule of law and con-
stitutionalism”,71 some of the other values which the EU is supposed to respect. We 
should expect the EU, therefore, to take into account the other values laid down in Art. 
2 TEU as well when deciding whether a newly formed State formerly part of a Member 
State is eligible for EU membership; a secession reflecting the will of the majority but 
following from or resulting in the breaches of the EU’s foundational values should not 
result in legitimate membership claims.72 The implication of the latter is of course the 
diminished likelihood of such a secession, given that seceding from a Member State on-
ly to stay out of the Union does not seem to correspond to the programme of any of 
the credible secessionist movements in the EU at the moment. We will return to this 
important connection later on in this analysis. 
Of particular acuteness among the principles and values to the secession process 
ought to comply with is the rule of law, if only because more recent rounds of enlarge-
ment have raised concerns about the protection of the rule of law within the EU.73 With 
respect to secession, adherence to the rule of law requires that secessions happen in ac-
cordance with national constitutional requirements (presuming the latter are reasona-
ble, of course, as opposed to the arrangements that ban any secessions talk outright 
 
70 For this argument see also: N. WALKER, Scotland and the EU: Comment by NEIL WALKER, cit. 
71 C. CLOSA, Scotland and the EU: Comment by CARLOS CLOSA, in Verfassungsblog, 12 September 
2014, www.verfassungsblog.de. 
72 When combined, these criteria are similar to the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in 
Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union, adopted by the EC in 1991 and put into practice by the Badinter 
Commission, in which the EU expressed the intention to recognise new States which “have constituted 
themselves on a democratic basis, have accepted the appropriate international obligations and have 
committed themselves in good faith to a peaceful process and to negotiations”. This requires those new 
States, in addition to the principle of democracy, also to respect the rule of law, human rights, and minor-
ity rights. For an analysis see: R. RICH, Recognition of States: The Collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet 
Union, in European Journal of International Law, 1993, p. 36 et seq. 
73 C. CLOSA, D. KOCHENOV, J.H.H. WEILER, Reinforcing rule of law oversight in the European Union, in EUI 
Working Papers, 2014/25; J.-W. MÜLLER, Should the EU Protect Democracy and the Rule of Law inside Mem-
ber States?, in European Law Journal, 2015, p. 141 et seq. EU’s own obvious problems both with democracy 
and with the Rule of Law are outside the scope of this paper. On the former see, especially, J.H.H. WEILER, 
Epilogue: Living in a Glass House: Europe, Democracy and the Rule of Law, in C. CLOSA, D. KOCHENOV (eds), 
Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union, cit. On the latter, D. KOCHENOV, EU Law without 
the Rule of Law: Is the Veneration of Autonomy Worth It?, in Yearbook of European Law, 2015. 
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without giving the constitutional rearrangement any possibility whatsoever)74. The rule 
of law is probably the main criterion by which it is possible to distinguish between the 
different secessionist movements, forming a continuum of acceptability, as it were. 
Comparisons between Scotland, Catalonia and Kosovo are as telling in this respect, as 
they are legally difficult: comparisons know clear limits.75 The reasons for this are clear: 
while the Scottish referendum was democratically approved by both the British as well 
as Scottish parliament and took place fully in accordance with British constitutional re-
quirements,76 the same cannot be said of the Catalonian developments even notwith-
standing the fact that the rigidity of the stance adopted by the Spanish government can 
be subject of legitimate criticism.77 Kosovo is a seemingly different matter: while interna-
tional law on self-determination is oftentimes guided by a victimhood ethos: demonstra-
ble suffering being the best tool to amplify the claim,78 the very fact that even among the 
Member States of the EU some failed to recognize its statehood, speaks for itself. 
 
74 In this we agree with Vicky Jackson’s argument that silence about the issue of secessions is prefer-
able to either black-letter regulation in a Constitution, or an outright prohibition. Flexibility is definitely 
one of the keys to stability: V. JACKSON, Secession, Transnational Precedents and Constitutional Silences, 
paper presented at the I-CON S conference, New York, 2015. See also, in the same vein, C.R. SUNSTEIN, 
Constitutionalism and Secession, cit. 
75 S. ROY, Privileging (Some Forms of) Interdisciplinarity and Interpretation: Methods in Comparative 
Law, in International Journal of Constitutional Law, 2014, p. 786 et seq. The comparison between Scotland 
and Kosovo was drawn by Barroso on the Andrew Marr show. For the transcript, see the reference at 
note 8. 
76 S. DOUGLAS-SCOTT, How Easily Could an Independent Scotland Join the EU?, cit., p. 21; M. KEATING, 
Scotland and the EU: Comment by MICHAEL KEATING, cit. 
77 See Spanish Constitutional Court, judgment no. 42/2014 of 25 March 2014; V. FERRERES COMELLA, 
The Spanish Constitutional Court Confronts Catalonia’s ‘Right to Decide’, in European Constitutional Law 
Review, 2015, p. 571 et seq. The US Judiciary took a similar view in Supreme Court of the United States of 
America, Texas v. White, judgment of 12 April 1869; see also Kohlhaas v. Alaska, judgment of 17 Novem-
ber 2006. For a radically different approach, see the Quebec secession case. Despite the absence of Con-
stitutional provisions allowing for secession, the Canadian Supreme Court decided that the federal gov-
ernment would be under an obligation to negotiate with Quebec would a clear majority of the Quebecois 
favour secession. Choudry and Howse see this step as one that “promotes democracy” and one which 
tries “restoring the legitimacy of the Canadian Constitution”. S. CHOUDRY, R. HOWSE, Constitutional Theory 
and the Quebec Secession Reference, cit., pp. 163-165. 
78 On the remedial nature of statehood claims see: A.E. BUCHANAN, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-
Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 335; J. 
VIDMAR, Democratic Statehood in International Law: The Emergence of New States in Post-Cold War Prac-
tice, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013, pp. 159-169; M. WELLER, Contested Statehood: Kosovo’s Struggle for 
Independence, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 272-274. In its advisory Opinion on Kosovo, the 
ICJ considered that it was not necessary to resolve the questions concerning remedial secession. Interna-
tional Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo, advisory opinion of 22 July 2010, para. 83. 
Victimhood seems to be acquiring a new meaning in law outside of the secessions context, subject to se-
rious criticism: A. SAJÓ, Victimhood and Vulnerability as Sources of Justice, in D. KOCHENOV, G. DE BÚRCA, A. 
WILLIAMS (eds), Europe’s Justice Deficit?, Oxford: Hart Publishing 2015. 
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Adherence to the principles of democracy as well as the rule of law require that the 
EU recognize constitutionally sound secessions reflecting the will of the majority of the 
people of the seceding territory enjoying the right to vote under the law of the respec-
tive Member State – which would have been the case for Scotland would the majority 
have voted differently. The EU should not blackmail the people of the territory deciding 
on secession into remaining part of the Member State.79 Adopting an agnostic position 
with regard to possible secessions would be a more acceptable stance, as Neil Walker 
equally concluded.80 We would push this argument further still; simply waiting through 
the secession process is not enough. Should a territory acquire statehood on the basis 
of a democratic mandate and desires to remain part of the European integration pro-
cess, the EU must approach the seceded State in a manner harmonious to its ethos, to 
which we will turn next, thereby also bearing in mind the interest of its own as well as 
the seceded States citizens, companies, and all others affected. 
It goes without saying that for independent States to be able to accede to the EU, 
evidently more is required than their secession to be compliant with principles of dem-
ocratic representation and the rule of law.81 In addition to respecting all of the EU’s 
foundational values in Art. 2 TEU, those States would have to comply with the other Co-
penhagen criteria and possible further pre-accession demands.82 In the context of se-
cessions good neighbourly relations will definitely play an important role (particularly in 
conducting relations with the State the new entity is splitting from), to name just one 
example.83 At the Copenhagen criteria baseline, the newly-emerging State will have to 
demonstrate its “capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within 
the Union” and be able “to take on the obligations of membership including adherence 
to the aims of political, economic and monetary union” therefore.  
It cannot be taken for granted of course that new States automatically fulfil all these 
criteria. Even newly independent States that have been part of the EU for many years as 
parts of other Member States would still have to adopt new laws and transpose sec-
ondary legislation in order to be fully compliant with the requirements imposed by EU 
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law, to say nothing of the need to build up all the necessary organs and structures of 
statehood.84 While much can be achieved by upgrading the municipal structures in 
place, a lot of work will still be required before a former province, however self-
governing, becomes a truly operational State entity. This being said, and in complete 
agreement with Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, none of these are insurmountable obstacles. 
Considering the States, with respect, of a (much) more difficult pedigree that became 
full-fledged members of the Union throughout its history without solving deeply-rooted 
fundamental problems eroding the core of their statehood,85 territories that secede 
from Member States that have been part of the EU for many years, enjoying stable insti-
tutions as well as a good economic and human rights track-record are highly unlikely to 
experience systemic difficulties in the course of transformation into States or fall short 
on EU pre-accession criteria. In the case of Scotland at least, the possible hurdles could 
not only be overcome, but would also be minimal.86 
IV. Secessions and the ethos of European integration 
Joseph Weiler’s objections to allowing States that acquired independence through se-
cession to join the EU are of a different kind. He agrees, in the case of Scotland at least, 
that there are no legal impediments for them to join would they become independent 
and that the adjustments necessary are of a technical nature and not too difficult to 
overcome.87 His objections seem to be chiefly political, not legal, and are twofold. First 
of all, he fears that secession of one territory will create a domino effect among other 
regions pushing for secession, particularly if accession to the EU is almost automatic. 
More importantly, however, the secessionist movements within the Member States act 
in a manner fundamentally opposing the ethos of European integration, as Weiler sees 
it. It is this “Euro-tribalism”, in the words of Weiler, which we should not support.88 Per-
haps one can wonder to what extent the motivations for secession should truly matter 
and if not the EU should be primordially concerned with the nature and character of the 
new State and the way the secession process was conducted. However, even if the se-
cessionist movement’s attitudes are to be taken into account, which is not unreasona-
ble, Weiler’s view of those movements is disputable. 
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The EU, on this view, is premised on an ethos of forgiveness and reaching out to the 
other, incompatible with selfish nationalism and thus should not embrace the products 
of the secessionist movements that are construed upon an entirely outdated as well as 
demoralizing nationalist and utilitarian attitude, or at least so goes the argument.89 
Such rendering of the Union and of secessionist movements, once drained of some 
emotions, is deeply questionable. Even for those who are sure that the Scots who voted 
Yes are as tribalist and backward-looking as charged, it should be quite clear that the 
accusation does not solve the outstanding problem: how to build relations with the 
newly-emerging States which secede from existing EU Member States in the Europe of 
the 21st century. 
But actually: are those voting in favor of secession truly the “Euro-tribalists” Joseph 
Weiler holds them for? Do they truly represent ideas that disqualify them from the 
membership of a Union that reaches out to the Croatians, the Irish, the Serbs and the 
Kosovars (among innumerable others)? And if it is the ethos of forgiveness and integra-
tion, as well as a forward-looking perspective that has historically characterized the EU, 
what should the EU’s attitude towards a secession that has come about through demo-
cratic deliberation and that respects the other of the EU’s core values be: dismissive and 
exclusionary or open-minded and welcoming? 
One should, first of all, question Weiler’s interpretation of the kind of nationalism at 
stake in many of the regions that desire independence. It is far from evident that those 
regions are “reverting to an early 20th Century post World War I mentality”.90 A more ac-
curate interpretation of the matter has been provided by Will Kymlicka, whose analysis 
is worth quoting in full: “the assumption that minority cultural nationalisms are a defen-
sive and xenophobic reaction to modernity is often overstated. [… T]here are many cas-
es of minority nationalisms around the world today which are not all that different from 
French and American revolutionary nationalism, in the sense that they too are forward-
looking political movements for the creation of a society of free and equal citizens. They 
seek to create a democratic society, defined and united by a common language and 
sense of history. I think this is what most Québécois nationalists seek, as well as most 
Catalan, Scottish, and Flemish nationalists. They are not trying to avoid modernity; they 
are precisely trying to create a modern democratic society”.91 
Regardless of whether we agree with or (mis)understand the aspirations and moti-
vations of those seeking secessions, we must be careful not to dismiss every instance of 
minority nationalism as belonging to the kind of mindset that is concerned with “na-
tional purità” and resulted in “ethnic cleansing”.92 But even if one sees secession as a 
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historical mistake, representing an outdated nationalistic perspective that runs counter 
to what the EU has aspired to achieve, the epitome of forgiveness would be the one 
that accepts the new State despite the people’s mistaken decision to secede. What 
could be more in line with the EU’s historical ethos (grand colonization projects aside) 
than the EU and in particular the Member State from which the territory has seceded to 
say: despite our disagreements about what should have happened, despite our past 
and present tensions and conflicts, we welcome you to the European family and recog-
nize you as an independent Member State with which we share a common destiny? 
Wishing seceding States “a Bon Voyage in their separatist destiny” rests upon a pro-
foundly disputable reading of the European ethos.93 
It might be “ironic if the prospect of Membership in the Union ended up providing 
an incentive for the ethos of political integration”,94 Weiler writes, but it would be no 
less ironic if the EU, which is the reply to absolute sovereignty ideologies, the tamer of 
States and the promotor of liberal, inclusive and tolerant nationhood,95 would exclude 
those who share the most profound European values, pushing them to the fringes of 
European society, and forcing them to be the sovereign entities the EU has always as-
pired to overcome. Contrary to what Weiler assumes, there is no indication at all that 
those who support secession do not share the ethos of European integration. To the 
opposite, those who strive for secession might very well be more supportive of the Eu-
ropean project – and what this project stands for – than some of the current Member 
States. Moreover, the population of territories with secessionist movements, such as 
Scotland, seem more inclusive and respectful towards the other than some of the 
Member States that joined the EU in recent years, which at times have a highly dubious 
track-record concerning the protection of minorities, the rule of law and human 
rights.96 Ironically, the EU itself is guilty as charged of bringing minority protection on 
the ideological altar of the internal market,97 as well as promoting quite a one-sided vi-
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and the technicalities, like “autonomy” trump values, such as the protection of human 
rights or the rule of law,100 which the EU is powerless to enforce in the Member States 
deviating from the proclaimed ideals.101 Upon such a (radical) reading, (potential) Mem-
ber States with a more questionable reputation, with all respect, will definitely be more 
at home in Europe than the Scots. Yet, the EU should be too good even to ask the Scots 
what they want after their betrayal of the UK, Joseph Weiler is telling us. 
There is no denying of the fact of course that the secessionist regions’ interest in 
membership of the EU is to a great degree driven by utilitarian considerations.102 In this 
sense there can be no dispute about the fact that secessions become a much more at-
tractive option due to the presence of the EU. Indeed, as Eric Hobsbawm explained in 
detail, the EU added the viability component missing from the small States secessionist 
claims throughout the history of development of nationalism.103 In this sense we see a 
reversal in the vector of nationalism in which the presence of the EU definitely plays a 
role, even if this role is not necessarily decisive. While classical nationalism of the 19th 
century aspired for unification, this is not any more the case partly due to the fact that 
the structure of global economy, coupled with the rise of regional organisations, like the 
EU, make much smaller States viable projects, which can be effectively sustained 
through time. So the internal market, EU citizenship, and the principle of non-
discrimination allow the seceded States, would they be allowed to join the EU, to enjoy 
many of the benefits of scale they could enjoy would they have remained part of anoth-
er Member State. Simultaneously, the structures making smaller States viable also limit 
the sovereignty of such States, imposing serious limitations on the political agendas 
which they can actually pursue. It is widely assumed (and might be correct)104 that it is 
much more difficult to fail as a State, both economically and in terms of democratic and 
Rule of Law-backsliding, once in the EU. Indeed, this was arguably one of the main ar-
guments for joining the Union for the States from behind the iron curtain: a safety-valve 
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against themselves105 and the question is open whether Scotland or Catalonia (unlike, 
say, Hungary or Poland) will actually need to see such a safety-valve to guarantee their 
democracy and development in action. In any event, blaming the EU for making seces-
sions from the Member States premised upon joining the Union easier would be an ab-
surd move: it is engrained in the EU’s very nature to challenge the sovereigntist status 
quo (let us not forget that the EU’s strong point and its main deficiency, the humiliation 
of the State, is its main constitutional tactic).106 Simultaneously also empowering those 
seeking secession and, afterwards, accession, seems to be a natural by-product of what 
the Union is about. It would be unfair also to exclude newly emerging States from EU 
membership for their utilitarian motives, for the simple reason that it is difficult to un-
derstand how that differentiates those regions from current Member States and, even 
trickier perhaps, why exactly joining the EU should not be a utilitarian choice. One 
would be tempted to share Weiler’s concern for the “what’s in it for us”107 mentality that 
currently plagues the EU, but it is difficult to understand how being as good/bad as the 
current Member States is a criterion by which we can exclude seceded States seeking 
accession. Instead, a seceding State’s eligibility for EU membership should be examined 
according to the same criteria we used for other enlargements. 
Most importantly, utilitarianism alone cannot fully account for secessionist move-
ments, if only because secession might be entirely unwise from a utilitarian perspective. 
Many of those favoring secession must surely also be regarded as having different and 
deeply held convictions about the collective future of their nation. One may dismiss 
these feelings of nationalism as merely imagined as they certainly are,108 but that does 
not change the profound social reality within many Member States.109 And while the 
EU’s historic ethos has been to tame feelings of nationalism, it is undisputable that it 
was not designed to fully overcome national sentiments, thereby destroying the Mem-
ber States, let alone to recreate problematic quasi-nationalisms at the supranational 
level.110 This is perfectly demonstrated by EU citizenship’s derivative nature, inter alia, 
which Weiler also stresses in his contribution.111 If the people of a current Member 
State’s territory secede following a constitutionally legitimated expression of collective 
autonomy but meanwhile unequivocally indicate, through a request for EU member-
 
105 W. SADURSKI, Constitutionalism and the Enlargement of Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012. 
106 G. DAVIES, The Humiliation of the State as a Constitutional Tactic, in F. AMTENBRINK, P.A.J. VAN DEN 
BERG (eds), The Constitutional Integrity of the European Union, The Hague: Asser Press, 2010, p. 147. 
107 J.H.H. WEILER, Scotland and the EU: a Comment by JOSEPH H.H. WEILER, cit. 
108 B. ANDERSON, Imagined Communities, London-New York: Verso, 1991. 
109 D. MILLER, On Nationality, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
110 Pace Habermas: J. LACROIX, Does Europe Need Common Values? Habermas vs Habermas, in Euro-
pean Journal of Political Theory, 2008, p. 141 et seq. See also D. KOSTAKOPOULOU, The Future Governance 
of Citizenship, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, Chapter 3. 
111 J.H.H. WEILER, Scotland and the EU: a Comment by JOSEPH H.H. WEILER, cit. 
88 Dimitry Kochenov and Martijn van den Brink 
ship, that they want to tame their feelings of nationalism, the EU would betray its ethos 
as well as its foundational values would it frustrate or reject such a request.  
Instead of blackmailing secessionist regions into remaining part of their State, the 
EU should adopt a more neutral approach, therefore, which respects the exercise and 
outcome of the democratic process of collective self-determination. This requires the 
EU to distance itself from the national debate and respect and endorse the outcome of 
the vote on secession. Would the majority of the people of a region prefer independ-
ence, the EU must approach the seceded territory with an open mind, finding the best 
solution for all parties involved. 
V. How to approach a seceded territory 
Truly respecting the democratic right of the people of the seceded State to determine 
their collective future also requires acknowledging that the seceded territory should be 
free to decide what kind of relationship to the EU it prefers. To claim that newly-
independent States formerly forming part of a Member States of the EU and thus being 
subjected to the EU legal order should also embrace the EU in the future because their 
citizens cannot lose their EU citizenship rights is not only problematic from a legal point 
of view,112 particularly given the derivative nature of EU citizenship, but also violates 
democratic principles. It should be up for the people of the newly-formed State to de-
cide whether they want to apply for EU membership, or whether they prefer a different 
kind of relationship with the EU.113 Would the people of the seceding State be allowed 
to retain the citizenship of their previous State, which is clearly a preferred solution,114 
this might not be an issue at all. Where this is not the case, however, the consequence 
of the decision not to apply for EU membership will be the loss of the status as EU citi-
zen upon the date of secession.115 It is difficult to see how individuals who are negative-
ly affected by this could prevent this from happening would the majority of their people 
decide to leave the EU. 
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We can all see though that a decision of a newly-formed State that used to be part 
of an EU Member State not to apply for EU membership is not a really attractive one. 
This would be the kind of tribalism we should deplore. Furthermore, it would severely 
undermine the interests of the companies established in the seceding State, as well as 
the workers, students, as well as other EU citizens residing there. Of course, also the cit-
izens of the seceding State residing within an EU Member State would pay the price of 
their State not becoming an EU Member State. This being said, the problem is largely 
ephemeral, of course, since, presuming there is minimal good will, an agreement be-
tween the EU and the Member States and the newly-independent State can be negoti-
ated with an aim to minimize the negative effects of secession for EU citizens in the se-
ceding State. 
Preventing any negative consequences of secession from emerging is of course the 
EU’s responsibility as well. Rather than slamming the door to EU membership in the 
face of the seceded State, the EU must be open and constructive. Of course, to repeat 
what was said throughout this article, this requires that the decision to secede was le-
gally and constitutionally sound, was taken through democratic means, and that the 
State fulfils the other membership criteria. If this is the case, the EU and the Member 
States should be open to the applicant State, not only because it should want to protect 
the acquired rights of business and citizens, but also because the EU’s historic ethos of 
inclusion, integration, and accepting the other warrants an open and welcoming ap-
proach towards States that acquired independence through secession. Even more, the 
EU should be ready to tame its own Member States unwilling to engage in constructive 
dialogue (a negative example of such State is constantly provided by the Greek behavior 
in its neighbourhood which is far from constructive and has totally undermined)116 inter 
alia, the EU’s and the UN’s attempts to solve the Cyprus issue117 as well as to stabilize 
the situation in Macedonia,118 which is a constant target of the illegal pressure by 
Greece.119 It is not unlikely that some of the Member States will be ready to misbehave 
in a similar way, making the EU as well as their peers and the newly-independent State 
to pay a high price. A strong presumption concerning the nature of such behavior as 
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breaching the duty of loyalty, should be adopted by the Commission, taking all the nec-
essary steps to ensure that Greek-style tradition of ignoring international law and un-
dermining dialogue does not serve as an example of solving outstanding issues in Eu-
rope involving the territories which have already been within the scope of EU law. 
There are two legal routes through which seceding States formerly belonging to an 
EU Member State can be welcomed to the EU. The first and at first sight most obvious is 
the normal Treaty accession procedure in Art. 49 TEU.120 During the discussions in the 
lead-up to the Scottish referendum on independence a second option was suggested: 
namely, Art. 48 TEU, which allows for internal enlargement and immediate membership 
of the seceding State through the revision of the Treaties. The latter was put forward as 
an option because the use of Art. 48 TEU would allow for a “seamless transition”,121 al-
lowing the seceding State to become an EU member on the date of secession thereby 
preventing the seceding State to have to leave the EU before being able to join again. 
The Art. 49 TEU accession route would force the seceding State to temporarily leave. 
After the accession Treaty has been signed by the independent State, it must, after all, 
still be ratified by all Member States.122 
To ensure the uninterrupted continuity of rights and obligations within the context 
of the internal market and the area of freedom security and justice, the Art. 48, TEU 
route clearly appears to be the preferable option. It would allow for internal enlarge-
ment and thus prevent that a territory has to leave the EU, even for a very brief period. 
To dismiss the possibility of the Art. 48 TEU procedure out of hand and suggest that a 
seceding territory can only apply upon independence, as done by former Commission 
President Barroso,123 is unhelpful and smells of particularly cautious and traditional le-
gal advice, which is all too handy to ensure that the Union subtly takes sides in the se-
cession debate by taking the position of the government opposing secession. 
Instead, it would clearly be preferable to examine the different options available 
with an open mind. In all likelihood we would be required then to acknowledge that 
both routes provide us with political and practical difficulties. Both Treaty amendment 
and accession require the uniform consent of all Member States. Considering the num-
ber of Member States with internal struggles for secession, it is far from certain that all 
Member States will ratify the revision or accession Treaty without further ado. Whereas 
Art. 48 TEU might allow for a seamless transition, it is thus certainly not guaranteed that 
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it will create “a smooth transition”.124 Additionally, the initiation of the Treaty revision 
procedure might be used by other Member States as a pretext to try to renegotiate 
their own membership within the EU. Without the willingness of the Member States to 
act in a prudential manner, ensuring that secession does not result in a temporal gap of 
legal protection for citizens, companies, and others benefitting from the internal mar-
ket, Art. 48 TEU might very well become a more lengthy process than Art. 49 TEU.125 
While Art. 48 TEU seems the preferable procedure, depending on the political con-
text the Treaty revision procedure might still not guarantee uninterrupted membership 
for the seceding territory. During the ongoing process of negotiations, those who risk 
losing the rights acquired during the EU membership of the seceding territory should 
be protected against the unduly and temporary termination of rights during the transi-
tional period of non-membership. Even if the negotiations for full membership turn out 
to last longer, no one should aim at concocting a temporary legal limbo during which 
important rights are suddenly temporarily terminated. Even in the case of legal or polit-
ical disagreement about accession, there can be no moral excuse for such a situation to 
happen (unless one feels like punishing the Euro-tribalists, of course). In case a period 
of non-membership is inevitable, measures will have to be adopted for this period to 
protect those with acquired rights, as Christophe Hillion and Nick Barber have rightly 
suggested.126 The preferable option, however, still remains uninterrupted membership.  
VI. Conclusion 
While the surge of independence movements within several of the EU’s Member States 
raises a set of intricate political and legal questions, the impression that these move-
ments represent something unseen before must be rejected. Mutations of statehood, 
through secession or by other means, are of all times. This time, however, those push-
ing for independence are not the people outside the geographical boundaries of Eu-
rope, they are European citizens at the heart of the continent. Coming closer to home, 
the legal and political issues raised by those developments need to be responded to 
adequately by the EU. 
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The position adopted by several of the EU officials, unfortunately, suffers from 
some blatant shortcomings. Rather than adhering to the principle of democracy, which 
would have warranted a more agnostic stance with respect to possible secessions exer-
cised through legally sound democratic means, the EU has taken a more interventionist 
perspective warning those territories that their future as members of the European 
family is far from certain would they opt for independence, thereby making secession a 
less attractive option. This view, espoused by Weiler as well, though in an even more 
extreme fashion, would not only leave ample room for hypocrisy accusations, bearing in 
mind the States of more dubious pedigree that have been allowed to join or are on the 
waiting list, but also opposes the values upon which the EU is founded. Adherence to 
the principles of democracy as well as the rule of law require the EU to recognize legally 
and constitutionally sound and democratically legitimated secessions, provided that the 
other membership criteria are fulfilled of course.  
Not only would any other decision run counter to the EU’s foundational values, 
banning the seceded territory from the European family would also betray the ethos of 
European integration. This ethos, which rests upon inclusion, integration, and the em-
brace of the other, is not served by removing or frustrating the prospect of EU mem-
bership; rather, and contra to what Weiler assumes, embracing those who share core 
European values, despite past and present disagreements, thereby taming the national-
ist sentiments within those territories, is the position that is premised upon a firm belief 
in the EU’s historic ethos. 
Respecting the democratic right of the people of the seceded State equally requires 
that the seceded territory is left free to determine what sort of relationship to the EU it 
prefers. The EU ought to adopt an open and welcoming approach, should the seceded 
State opt for EU membership. The EU should use all means to prevent that the acces-
sion process is frustrated. Such an approach also requires the EU to try to prevent the 
loss of rights of those presently covered by EU law. Whether through the Art. 48 TEU 
route or by temporarily protecting those with acquired rights by other means until the 
seceded territory becomes an official EU Member State, the road to membership 
should be as smooth as possible. Rather than punishing the people of a seceded terri-
tory for the exercise of their democratic right to self-determination, a European Union 
that pretends to take seriously its foundational values and historic ethos should be ex-
pected to welcome those States to the European family. 
